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In all countries, some public officials are more corrupt than others depending upon variations in the opportunities for private gain and the willingness to pay of private citizens and businesses. Effective anti-corruption campaigns need to be able both to identify which types of officials are most likely to be corrupt and to understand why some, such as the judiciary or the police, are more corrupt than others. A number of surveys report household and business perceptions of corruption across official types, but these data provide no information on why one type of official is more susceptible to corruption than another. One is left with plausible, but empirically untested, theoretical speculations. Newly available Peruvian data permit analysis of this very important issue. In this paper I use the data both to measure corruption by type of official and to seek the causes of corruption across official types.
The existing literature has uncovered some determinants of corruption using a crosssection of countries. Factors found to be associated with lower corruption include a common law legal system, Protestant traditions and British colonial rule (Treisman 2000) , fiscal decentralization (Fisman and Gatti 2000) , higher relative salaries for public officials (van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001) , the absence of an industrial policy (Ades and Di Tella 1997 ) and a greater presence of women in parliament and the civil service (Swamy et al. 2001) . Most of these causes vary only at the country level and most are not amenable to direct policy interventions. My data allow me to study determinants of corruption whose natural variation is across official types; this gives new insights into the causes of corruption and generates some practical policy implications. twenty-one types of public official. The questions pertain to the previous twelve months, and the official types are specific Peruvian institutions, such as the judiciary or the social security agency (political parties and the legislature are not among the specified types). Thus the emphasis is on reports of actual experience, not perceptions, of corruption.
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To establish a corruption ranking by official type, I calculate the ratio of an institution's share of bribe takings to its share of household/official interactions. This measure corrects for the fact that an institution might appear to be relatively honest simply because few households even interact with officials from that institution. By this measure, the judiciary is by far the most corrupt official type in Peru, with an impressive 42 per cent of reported bribe revenues compared to only 2 per cent of interactions. The police force is the other extremely corrupt institution, with 27 per cent of bribes and only 2 per cent of interactions (see Table 1 
below). Transparency
International (2004) reports that in 36 of 62 countries surveyed, respondents perceived the police and the judiciary to be the most corrupt institutions after political parties and the legislature.
This indicates that the Peruvian situation is not unique and could provide lessons for other countries.
There are a number of reasons why corruption might vary across official types. First, the services offered may be demanded by clients with different ability and willingness to pay or even different scruples. Officials have some monopoly power and can charge different prices (including zero) to different clients for their services (price-discrimination). We would expect officials in institutions with richer clients to take bribes more frequently and to take larger bribes.
Jennifer Hunt and Sonia Laszlo (2005) have confirmed empirically that richer clients do pay more frequent and higher bribes, both in general and within official type.
Second, officials provide different types of services in return for bribes, and these vary in value. This influences the client's willingness to bribe as well as the level of payoffs. Bribes vary in size both because the value of the ultimate benefit varies and because officials' ability to provide the benefit promptly also varies. The latter, in turn, depends on three considerations: how many officials are involved in the conclusion of business for one client, how easy it is for superiors to monitor officials, and the resources available to the institution compared to the demands on its officials. For example, police officers, who often meet clients one-on-one in the street, have complete control over the imposition of fines and are hard to monitor. If the resources of the agency granting drivers' licenses are insufficient to prevent large queues forming, the conditions will be ripe for frustrated clients to bribe to get to the head of the queue. Third, institutions vary in the degree of internal competition between officials with different levels of scruples. For example, a customer wishing to have a telephone connected who encounters an official demanding a bribe could return the next day and hope for an official with more scruples. By contrast, in a court case brought before a judge, it will usually be impossible to choose another judge unless he or she is caught explicitly demanding a payoff. 4 Fourth, institutions may vary in the degree to which combating corruption is a management priority.
Finally, public officials with few scruples will migrate to institutions which offer more opportunities for corruption, reinforcing other patterns.
The Peruvian data permit me to quantify the impact of three factors: the direct effect of client characteristics, the indirect effect of client characteristics, and the share of client cases that officials acting honestly are able to conclude within the twelve-month window, adjusted for client characteristics (the "adjusted conclusion rate"). The direct impact of client characteristics indicates whether the price-discrimination model helps to explain cross-official corruption.
Client scruples are, of course, unobservable, so their impact cannot be judged. I assess the indirect or spillover effects of the client characteristics by asking if the characteristics of the average client who deals with a given official type has an impact on corruption even after household characteristics are taken into account. This captures whether official/client interactions are influenced by the characteristics of other clients. This could happen if rich clients corrupt officials so they behave less scrupulously with all clients, or if rich clients attract unscrupulous officials to the institution. The adjusted conclusion rate is designed to capture administrative efficiency, resources and lack of red tape.
Raw bribery rates across official types range from almost zero to 37 per cent, and client characteristics explain 85 per cent of the variance in these rates. Nevertheless, even after correcting for differences in client characteristics, adjusted bribery rates still span 15 percentage points. Fully 46 per cent of this variance is explained by the adjusted conclusion rate: a 10 percentage point increase in this rate (a standard deviation) reduces the adjusted bribery rate by 4-5 percentage points, a very large effect. This is a causal effect as long as the conclusion rate of officials acting honestly is not affected by the extent of bribery in their institution. The results indicate that bribery rates are higher at institutions whose clients have a bribe-prone profile and whose clients are frustrated with slow service. Policy priorities for reducing the bribery rate should be improving administrative efficiency, providing more resources and cutting red tape.
The data reveal that neither raw bribery rates and bribe amounts nor rates and amounts adjusted for client characteristics are closely correlated across official types. Adjusting for client characteristics does not reduce the variance in bribe amounts across official type. However, a 10 percentage point increase in the adjusted conclusion rate reduces the adjusted bribe amount by a significant 30-32 per cent and explains at least 20 per cent of the variance. The results indicate that while differences in client profiles do not help explain the variation in bribe amounts by official type, clients frustrated with slow service pay higher and more frequent bribes.
I find some evidence that there is a role for spillover effects between clients in explaining both bribery rates and average bribe amounts. However, the results differ qualitatively between the bribery rate and bribe amount outcomes, and are difficult to interpret. I draw no firm conclusions.
Most of the high bribery rate for both the police and the judiciary is explained by the higher propensity to bribe (whether voluntarily or not) of their clients. That different clients use different types of official is not something that can or should be changed. However, the relatively high bribery rate of the judiciary, after adjusting for client characteristics, seems to be adequately explained by the judiciary's low conclusion rate (54 per cent, compared to 93 per cent for clients in the whole sample). The low conclusion rate also helps explain the very high value of bribes received by the judiciary. A key policy challenge for Peru is to train more lawyers and judges for permanent positions, so as to speed up judicial proceedings without sacrificing quality. The police, in contrast, have a much higher bribery rate, adjusted for observable client characteristics, than their conclusion rate would predict. Although increasing the conclusion rate would be helpful, the need for additional measures is even more urgent than for other institutions. These might include attempts to restrict abuse of police monopoly power, for example, by limiting the extortion of bribes from innocent motorists. TI argues that poor pay and equipment reduced the morale of the police, which combined with weak internal controls and sanctions, rendered them susceptible to small-and large-scale corruption, as well as to cooperation with criminals. At the time of its report, TI found that it was customary to bribe the transit police.
Corruption in Peru
Public administration generally was corrupted by poor pay, complex procedures for sanctioning bribe-taking and the frequent overturning of administrative sanctions by the judiciary. Only public servants with contracts comparable to those in the private sector were well-paid, but they lacked the job security that would protect them from political interference (and, presumably , that would allow them to report corruption by superiors).
The interim regime and the presidency of Alejandro Toledo that followed Fujimori's downfall both made corruption a priority, but they focused particularly on prosecuting actors in Overall, 4.9 per cent of households report having bribed in the previous twelve months.
Of households who had used at least one public official, 5.7 per cent had bribed. Although the share of households bribing may seem low, the bribery rates for some official types are very high, indicating that, at least for some official types, respondents were not ashamed or afraid to admit having bribed. The number of bribery episodes is somewhat understated, however, because each respondent can only report one bribery episode per official per year. If clients commonly use agents to act as intermediaries between themselves and officials, and bribes paid by the agent are reported in the survey by the agent (or no-one), rather than the client, the understatement will be worse and the share of households bribing will also be understated Which official types are most corrupt? Table 1 lists the twenty-one official types in order of their share of total bribery "episodes". A bribery episode is an encounter between a household (client) and official in which either a bribe was paid or a bribe was solicited by the official but the client refused to pay. Column 1 reports these shares, based on 91 668 total encounters between households and officials and 1628
7 Bertrand et al. (2005) analyze the use of agents for obtaining drivers' licenses in India.
bribery episodes. The police account for 35 per cent of bribes and the city (municipal) government for 21 per cent, with the judiciary in third rank with 12 per cent. These three institutions account for 68 per cent of bribery episodes. Column 2 shows that these institutions are even more dominant in terms of total bribe payments: the judiciary alone accounts for 42 per cent of the money paid in bribes, followed by the police with 27 per cent and city government with 11 per cent, making a total of 80 per cent. The third column puts these shares in perspective by reporting the official type's share in household/official interactions: that is, the number of households using the official divided by the total over all official types. The police and judiciary represent only 2 per cent each of interactions with officials, while the city government has a higher 10 per cent share.
The data are sufficiently detailed that there could be many ways to combine them to produce a measure of how corruption varies by official type. Presumably corruption is some combination of the bribery rate and the average level of bribes paid. 8 As a simple summary measure, I divide column 2 of Table 1 , essentially the product of the rate and the amount, by column 3, the usage rate of various types of officials. The results are displayed in column 4 of Table 1 and in Figure 1 .
By this measure, the judiciary is by far the most corrupt institution, with bribery levels twenty-six times the level that its usage rate would predict. The police force is also an outlier with about half the corruption of the judiciary. The next official type is "other", with one third the police corruption rate, but four times the next category. "Other" includes the Ministry of Transport and Communication, which houses the agency that grants drivers' licenses. Here the use of agents might be expected to lead to an underestimation of bribery. The "other" category also encompasses numerous small welfare programs as well as congress, the office of the president and the many unspecified ministries such as the Ministry of Energy and Mines. It is possible that corruption is high for this category because those who paid a bribe are more likely to remember having used an unspecified official type.
Corruption in other institutions is relatively modest compared to the top three although all these institutions carry out tasks that might lead to bribery. For example, the city government provides a variety of bribery-prone services such as construction and demolition permission, trash collection and title to property. Arbitration is to some extent a substitute for the judiciary.
The Ministry of Agriculture provides title to agricultural land and credit to farmers. The
Department of Migration provides visas for foreign workers and passports.
The election "office" in Table 1 is the Oficina Nacional de Processos Electorales (ONPE), while the election "court" is the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE). The election office (ONPE) runs elections, while the election court (JNE), which employs many lawyers, deals with electoral justice. The main reason for someone to use and bribe the election office (ONPE) would be to obtain a sticker confirming that he or she had participated in the mandatory voting (failure to obtain the sticker results in a suspension of legal rights). The election court (JNE) can issue exemptions and deals with any disputes over electoral outcomes or eligibility. Empirical strategy I analyze bribery rates and average bribe amounts in two steps. For bribery rates, I begin with the full data set of household/official pairs (21 officials times 36 000 households), and extract those 91 668 household/official pairs where the household used the official. I estimate the following probit regression for the probability of household i having a bribery episode with official type j:
The variables are defined as follows. The official type dummies are µ j; Z ij represents the number of visits the household made to the official type (possibly for more than one purpose);
and X i includes controls for the value of household consumption, respondent and household demographics, education, job type, student status, ownership of vehicles, location and time. The
Appendix lists the covariates in detail, and discusses the computation of the standard errors.
The estimated coefficients ∧ α 1j on the official type dummies µ j are the bribery rates adjusted for the characteristics of the clients. In a second step I use them as the dependent variable in a weighted least squares regression at the official type level: reflects how precisely the coefficients were estimated in the first stage, but in practice these weights do not differ much across official types. 9 The second set of weights reflects directly that bribery rates are measured with different precision by official type because of large differences in the number of clients using them.
I proceed similarly for the bribe amount. In the first stage I use the sample of 1628 household/official pairs where a bribe was paid and the amount specified, and run the OLS regression log (bribe amount ij ) = α 2j µ j + X i β 3 + β 4 Z ij + υ ij, behavior. This is designed to capture queues, red tape and other reasons for slow or ineffectual service that are unrelated to bribery. Respondents are asked whether their business with the official type was concluded ("concluyó"). As in English, the Spanish is ambiguous as to whether conclusion implies successful conclusion. The one word question "concluyó?" is beside the column where the number of visits to the official is recorded, and both are under the heading asking how many times the respondents went to the official (in the previous twelve months). In this context, it is likely that the respondents interpreted the question about conclusion as a question as to whether they were still in the process of dealing with the official. 10 The mean across households is 93 per cent, with the means by official type ranging from 54 per cent for the judiciary and 72 per cent for the Ministry of Agriculture to 98 per cent for state schools (see column 5 of Table 1 ).
10 I assume without evidence that respondents forced to pay off police officers to avoid fines for imaginary offences also interpret the question as asking whether they are still engaged in dealings with the officer.
I run a probit with the same covariates as for equation 1, excluding the number of visits Z ij , where the dependent variable is whether the client i concluded her business with the official j:
Because the conclusion of business is influenced by bribery behavior, I run this regression on a sample of household/official pairs where there was no bribery episode. I refer to the estimated coefficients ∧ α 3j on the official type dummies as the adjusted conclusion rate, and use them as one of the covariates in O j .
I assume that neither the average bribery rate nor the average amount paid for the official type belongs in equation 4 (that is, that they are not among the official characteristics being captured by the official type dummies µ j ). This is important: if speed at which officials conclude business honestly is affected by how many of their colleagues are taking bribes and/or how much they are taking in bribes, the adjusted conclusion rate will be endogenous in equation 2. For example, if corruption demoralizes honest officials or otherwise reduces effort in honest dealings, the coefficient on the adjusted conclusion rate in equation 2 will be biased downward, and any beneficial effect of fast conclusion overstated. A related point is that the sample includes some clients who did not notice that their slow service indicated the official was angling for a bribe. If dishonest and honest officials differ in ability, the adjusted conclusion rate would also not measure the conclusion rate that would obtain if all officials behaved honestly. Finally, if some respondents perceive the question about conclusion to mean successful conclusion, and if some of these respondents judge success based on whether the official was willing to perform an illegal act for the client, a high conclusion rate is not unambiguously a good thing.
The second variable I include in O j is the response rate to the question on the amount of the bribe paid. This functions as a selection correction, in case those who did not report the amount were disproportionately those who paid large bribes, and in case officials whose clients were loath to report the amount of the bribe had clients who also underreported bribing at all.
The response rate over all clients is 98 per cent, but is much lower for the food agency compared to any other official type: 50 per cent, compared to 86 per cent for the official type with the next lowest response rate. experimented unsuccessfully with a proxy for a fourth characteristic of officials: the value of the benefit the official has in his power (how much is at stake).
If a higher conclusion rate reduces bribery by reducing the number of clients disgruntled with the service, the correct specification for equation 2 is slightly different. In this case, O j should include a measure of client satisfaction, which should be instrumented by the conclusion rate. The coefficient on the satisfaction variable would then reflect the effect on bribery of a change in satisfaction caused by a change in the conclusion rate.
Such a measure of satisfaction is available: respondents are asked to rate the quality of service as good, medium or bad. Thirty-four per cent of clients rate their service as good; nine per cent as bad. As shown in column 6 of Table 1 , the share of clients rating the service as bad ranges from 38 per cent for the police to 4 per cent for state schools. I create, by official type, an adjusted share of clients reporting bad service, using an adjustment procedure identical to that used for the conclusion rate. I include this variable in O j and instrument it with the adjusted conclusion rate. To test for robustness, I alternatively instrument with the adjusted share of clients who reported seeing the official immediately, and replace the share of clients reporting bad service with the share reporting good service.
Raw and adjusted bribery rates and average bribe amounts Figure 2 indicates the raw bribery episode rates by official type and the associated 95 per cent confidence intervals, with the vertical line at 0.048 giving the city government rate as a reference point. Thirty-seven per cent of those using the police and 17 per cent of those using the judiciary had a bribery episode; bribery at the telephone and electric authorities was negligible. types is explained by client characteristics. It plots the raw and adjusted bribery rates on the same figure (with the city government bribery rate subtracted from the raw rates). The unweighted standard deviation of the 21 raw bribery rates is 0.084, while the unweighted standard deviation of the 21 adjusted bribery rates is 0.032, so two-thirds of the standard deviation, or 85 per cent of the variance, is explained by household characteristics. Client characteristics explain most of the (statistically significant) difference in the bribery rate between the judiciary and city government and more than half the difference between the police and city government. The adjusted judiciary and police bribery rates remain significantly higher than that of city government, however. The adjustment brings the lower bribery group, from the election office on down, slightly closer to the city government, although the gap remains statistically significant.
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I repeat this exercise for the bribe amount in Figures 5-7 . The large confidence intervals of Figure 5 , which reports raw means of log bribe amounts, reflect the small number of reported bribe amounts for some types of official. The highest "mean" is for the election court, where in fact only one bribe amount (of 80 Nuevo soles, or about US $24) is reported; the second ranked institution, the Ministry of Industry, also has only one bribe amount reported. The judiciary, which by contrast has many bribes and a tight confidence interval, is in third rank, closely followed by "other", arbitration, social security and the police. 12 The difference between the judiciary and the police is statistically significant, but many other gaps are not. The adjusted bribe amounts in Figure 6 have tighter confidence intervals and have some small ranking differences compared to the raw bribe means in Figure 5 . However, as Figure 7 makes clear, the adjustment scarcely affects the size of the gaps between the official types (the unweighted variance of 0.67 actually rises to 0.71). Although bribery rates vary across official types in large part because client profiles vary across official types, the variance in the size of bribes paid across official types is almost unrelated to these different profiles, and must instead be almost fully determined by differences in the institutions themselves.
Given these results, one can understand why the plots marked with circles in Figure 8 show little relation between the official types with high raw bribery rates and the official types with high raw average bribe amounts. The plots marked with crosses show that there is also no correlation between the adjusted rates and the adjusted bribe amounts.
Determinants of adjusted bribery rates and adjusted bribe amounts The first column of Table 2 shows that in the regression with weights based on the standard errors from the first (household/official) stage, the adjusted business conclusion rate alone explains 46 per cent of the variance in the bribery rate, and has a t-statistic of -4.0. In column 2 I add the response rate for the bribe amount, which is insignificant and does not affect the coefficient on the conclusion rate. To make the coefficients easy to interpret, I rerun the regression of column 2 performing all adjustments to obtain the dependent and independent variables using OLS, rather than using any probits. The resulting coefficient on the adjusted conclusion rate, in column 3, indicates that a 10 percentage point increase in this rate (the unweighted standard deviation) reduces the adjusted bribery rate by 3.8 percentage points, a very large effect.
The first three columns suggest that when conclusion rates are low, clients get frustrated and bribe. To check that dissatisfaction with service is indeed the correct mechanism, I control for the adjusted share of clients saying service was bad, instead of the adjusted conclusion rate, in column 4, and instrument it with the adjusted conclusion rate in column 5. In both columns, the coefficient on bad service is positive and significant, as expected, with a larger absolute value than the conclusion coefficient of columns 1 and 2. In column 6 I repeat column 5 with different weights, the share of households using the official type, which reduces the coefficient on the bad service variable.
To help interpret the coefficients, in column 7 I rerun the column 6 regression making adjustments using OLS only. The coefficient of 0.76 indicates that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of clients who think the service is bad increases the bribery rate by 7.6 percentage points. We can use the coefficient on the conclusion rate in the first stage of the IV regression, -0.65 (lower panel of column 7), to relate this coefficient to the direct coefficient on the conclusion rate in column 3 (-0.38). A 10 percentage point increase in the conclusion rate reduces the share of clients rating service as bad by 6.5 percentage points, which in turn reduces bribery by 0.76*6.5= 4.9 percentage points, similar to the 3.8 percentage point effect of column 3. The results are very similar when the first set of weights (from columns 1-5) is used.
The next step is to add to the covariates the third component of O j : average characteristics of clients, particularly the value of household consumption and the share of clients in various types of job such as white collar and self-employed in agriculture (see the Appendix).
Household consumption has a significant positive coefficient if the job categories are included, but not otherwise. Certain job category coefficients are significant, but only if household consumption is included. These unreported results are somewhat difficult to interpret. They might imply indirect or spillover effects between clients or indicate that unscrupulous officials gravitate to institutions with bribe-prone clients.
The corresponding regressions for the adjusted log bribe amounts are presented in Table   3 ; Figure 10 graphs the adjusted bribe amount against the adjusted conclusion rate (showing coefficients, not marginal effects). Columns 1 and 2 and the figure show that the adjusted business conclusion rate is significantly negatively related to the log bribe amount when the official types are weighted similarly (in the table) or equally (the regression line of the figure).
The fit is not as good as in the case of the bribery rates, however, with only 20 per cent of the variance in the bribe amount explained. In column 2, as in later columns, the response rate for the bribe amount has an insignificant coefficient. The fully linear version of column 2, presented in column 3, indicates that a 10 percentage point increase in the conclusion rate reduces the bribe amount by 38 log points or 32 percent, a large effect.
In columns 4 and 5 I control for the share of clients reporting bad service, rather than the conclusion rate. This variable has an insignificant coefficient when not instrumented, but a positive coefficient significant at the 10 per cent level when instrumented in column 5. The coefficient becomes smaller but much more significant when the weights are the number of bribe amounts reported, in column 6: the increased significance comes from the low weight on the observations from the Figure 10 regression line owing to their being based on a tiny number of bribes.
The fully linear results of column 7 indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of clients reporting bad service reduces the bribe amount by a statistically significant 58.9 log points (45 per cent), and the unadjusted R-squared rises to 0.43. Because the first stage coefficient on the conclusion rate is -0.60 (column 7 lower panel), this means that a 10 percentage point increase in the conclusion rate reduces the bribe amount by 0.60*58.9=35 log points, or 30 per cent. This is very similar to the direct effect of 38 log points in column 3.
As was the case for the bribery rate, average client household consumption is a significant determinant of the bribe amount only if the share of clients in various job categories are included, and vice versa. When all these covariates are included, the significant coefficients have opposite signs from the bribery rate regression (these results are not reported). More research is needed to characterize indirect or spillover effects between clients.
I have repeated the instrumental variables regressions of Tables 2 and 3 using the share of clients reporting good, rather than bad, service. The conclusion rate has a larger and much more significant effect on the number of clients judging service to be bad than on the number judging service to be good. Thus, the impact of the conclusion rate on bribery works not through creating happy clients, but rather through reducing the number of unhappy clients. Unreported regressions also indicate that using as an instrument the adjusted share of clients who saw the official immediately works well (and predicts bad service better than good service) and gives similar results to Tables 2 and 3 . Allowing clients to see the official immediately is a good first step in speeding up the conclusion rate, increasing client satisfaction and lowering bribery.
Conclusion
Peruvian data on bribery rates and on household bribe payments indicate that almost all the variance in bribery rates across types of officials can be explained by client characteristics and by the share of cases that officials acting honestly are able to conclude (adjusted for client characteristics). A ten percentage point increase in the adjusted conclusion rate (a standard deviation) reduces the bribery rate net of client characteristics by 4-5 percentage points. By contrast, the bribe amounts paid to different official types are unaffected by client characteristics and are uncorrelated with the bribery rates. However, a ten percentage point rise in the adjusted conclusion rate reduces the average amount of the bribe by 30-32 per cent. The effect of the conclusion rate is causal if the conclusion rate of officials acting honestly is independent of the degree of corruption of their colleagues.
Although it is inevitable that different types of officials serve client pools that differ in their propensity to bribe, the results indicate that speeding up clients' dealings with officials would be very helpful in reducing bribery rates and amounts. The rate at which officials conclude cases should be easier to monitor than bribery itself, but care must be taken to avoid a decline in service quality. Cutting red tape, providing more resources and improving administrative efficiency should all help.
I find some evidence that the characteristics of the official's other clients help to explain a given client's bribery behavior. However, the results differ qualitatively depending on whether one considers the bribery rate or bribe amount, and are difficult to interpret. I therefore draw no firm conclusions concerning indirect or spillover effects, or the concentration of unscrupulous officials in institutions with bribe-prone clients. I speculate that both for the bribe amount and bribery rates, the stakes and the degree of internal competition play a role in explaining the remaining variance.
The judiciary is by far the most corrupt institution in Peru, with both a high bribery rate and a high value of bribes, and it has by far the lowest conclusion rate. Only 54 per cent of clients concluded their business with the judiciary within the 12 month window of the survey.
The magnitude of the effects uncovered suggests considerable scope for reducing the bribery rate by speeding up Peru's infamously slow judicial proceedings. This will require a sustained investment in attracting and training more lawyers and judges and providing these judges with permanent contracts. Faster proceedings would also help reduce the high value of the bribes paid to the judiciary, but the inevitably high stakes, low internal competition and unwilling participation of defendants associated with judicial proceedings may be significant obstacles to progress.
The police are also highly corrupt in Peru: although the value of bribes paid is not much above average, the bribery rate is the highest of any official type, at 37 per cent. The police have a much higher bribery rate than their conclusion rate warrants. This suggests that other, possibly more difficult to implement reforms, must supplement an increase in the conclusion rate. A peculiarity of the police --that they can extort bribes from clients of their choosing, may well explain this, and should be a target of policy. The police may also deal with clients with fewer scruples than average, something that policy cannot influence.
Data and Regression Appendix
The 2002 The regressions used to adjust the probability of concluding business with the official, the perceived quality of service and the probability of seeing an official immediately contain the same covariates, excluding the number of visits, but the sample contains only respondents who did not experience a bribery episode. The standard errors in all regressions at the household/official level are clustered by district, allowing for correlation of the errors across residents of the same district in any survey period. This procedure takes into account that people in the same district might have similar behaviors, and that in fact panel households appear twice in the sample. Notes: Weighted regressions on 21 observations. The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the set of coefficients on the official type dummies in a probit for the probability of paying a bribe. The adjusted business conclusion rate is the set of coefficients on official type dummies from a probit for the probability of concluding business with the official. The adjusted share of clients reporting bad service is the set of coefficients on official type dummies from a probit for the probability of experiencing bad service with the official. For columns 3 and 7 all adjustments to variables are made using OLS. Where instrumental variables is performed, the adjusted share of clients reporting bad service has been instrumented with the adjusted business conclusion rate. Notes: Weighted regressions on 20 observations. The dependent variable in columns 1-5 is the set of coefficients on the official type dummies in an OLS regression for the (log) amount of the bribe. The adjusted business conclusion rate is the set of coefficients on official type dummies from a probit for the probability of concluding business with the official. The adjusted share of clients reporting bad service is the set of coefficients on official type dummies from a probit for the probability of experiencing bad service with the official. For columns 6 all adjustments to variables are made using OLS. Where instrumental variables is performed, the adjusted share of clients reporting bad service has been instrumented with the adjusted business conclusion rate.
